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Abstract
This paper shows what drivers the effectiveness of antitrust policy, by using internationally
collated data on the perception of effectiveness of competition policy. It concludes that average
antitrust effectiveness depends on per capita income and supranational policy leadership, such as
the one at the core of the EU. Additionally, it shows that some aspects of competition policy design
have a significant impact on policy results. Effectiveness is driven by using an economic approach
to judge dominance and abusive practices. We show that antitrust is sounder when the legal
mandate on merger policy focuses on competition in markets, rather than on more broadly defined
public interests. Antitrust effectiveness is also spurred by taking an active stance against cartels and
especially by introducing a leniency programme to enforce the prohibition of cartels. Finally, it is
important that an independent antitrust authority has the final say on prohibiting competition
restrains.
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Competition policy is at the core of a set of policies designed to foster product rivalry in
the goods and services markets. Promoting competition has become a policy objective en-
forced in order to pursue the ultimate goal of improving economic performance.
Policy-makers claim that, by designing and enforcing competition legislation and an-
titrust institutions that promote and protect competition effectively in the product markets,
welfare improvements are rendered. However, Bertrand and Ivaldi (2006) emphasise the
lack of research into identifying the distinct features of antitrust that drive the effectiveness
of promoting competition in the domestic markets.
Competition policy has very gradually been introduced in countries around the world;
Canada passed the first antitrust statute in 1889. The US has had a federal antitrust policy
since the Sherman Act of 1890; however, according to ABA Section of Antitrust Law (2003)
13 states had already enacted some form of antitrust statute. In 1889 Kansas enacted the first
generally applicable state antitrust law. Even Senator Sherman described the federal law he
was promoting as supplementary to the states’ antitrust statutes.
Most European countries, including the EU since its inception with the Treaty of Rome,
have had antitrust policies since the mid twentieth century; other countries have adopted an-
titrust regimes much more recently. Antitrust acts have been included in market orientated
reforms packages in South East Asia and Latin America, and also through regional trade
agreements; i.e. by Eastern Europe prior to acceding to the EU. Commitments to pass an-
titrust legislation have been included also in multilateral agreements such as the Uruguay
Round and in the accession agreements of the new members of the WTO. Around 100 na-
tions currently have competition laws. Merger policy was established in the USA in 1914,
but prior notifications of mergers have only been compulsory since 1976. The EU estab-
lished merger controls with a system of prior notification with a 1990 Council regulation.
Although antitrust statutes have been enacted worldwide, antitrust law design and im-
plementation differs substantially across countries. It is an open question as to the type of in-
stitution and as to which policy practices drive sounder enforcement. The aim of this paper
is to shed light on whether some of the distinctive characteristics related to the way antitrust
is enforced generally spur policy effectiveness. In order to do so, we have coded qualitative
information on objective features of competition policy from several countries around the
world. Next we offer a comprehensive insight into what drives the effectiveness of compe-
tition policy, from national variations in antitrust design and implementation, to variations
across policy areas. 
The paper is organised as follows. After this introductory section, Section 2 reviews the
literature on the drivers of antitrust effectiveness. Section 3 describes the data and the em-
pirical strategy. Section 4 shows and discusses the results, and the paper concludes with Sec-
tion 5.
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According to Aghion and Schankerman (2004), competition enhancing policies, reforms
and certain types of physical infrastructure facilitate welfare gains in three ways, through
cost reduction by incumbent firms, market selection of more efficient firms and entry. First,
competition provides an incentive for existing firms to reduce their production costs. Static
efficiency gains are achieved through reducing slack in the use of inputs, and via improved
resource allocation in response to higher competitive pressures; i.e. cost reduction or re-
structuring. Second, competition moves market shares from high-cost to low-cost firms, and
this reduces the industry average production costs; this is market selection of the efficient
incumbent firms. Third, post-entry competition reduces the incentives for new high-cost
firms to enter the market, but it encourages entry by low-cost potential entrants. Further-
more, competition might boost dynamic efficiency by spurring innovation and the faster dif-
fusion of new technologies, along the lines suggested by Aghion and Howitt (1996).
Although there is a consensus in the literature that competition provides welfare gains,
it is less clear cut how the effective enforcement of antitrust law fosters competition in the
market place, and whether antitrust policy spurs welfare. There is no common consensus on
how antitrust should be designed and enforced, in order to effectively promote competition.
There is a large literature on regulatory effectiveness. Recent papers such as Gutiérrez
(2003), Stern and Trillas (2003), Levine, Stern and Trillas (2005), Stern and Cubbin (2005)
and Cubbin and Stern (2006) discuss theoretically and empirically what drives effectiveness
in regulation of telecoms and energy. By contrast, less effort has been devoted to analyse the
drivers of antitrust effectiveness.
Additionally, it is far from established how the effectiveness of competition policy and
the impact of antitrust and welfare across countries should be measured. There are two main
avenues of research. 
On one hand, Serebrisky (2004) and Voigt (2006) use synthetic indicators to obtain a com-
prehensive picture of the strength of competition policy, based on objective indicators that rank
countries with a set of characteristics that are assumed to drive antitrust effectiveness. Voigt
(2006) estimates the significant and positive impacts on productivity of policy characteristics
that are assumed to strengthen antitrust. However, he shows that the estimated impacts are not
particularly robust, when the indicators for the general quality of institutions are included.
On the other hand, some papers such as Dutz and Hayri (2000) and Borrell and Tolosa
(2008) rely mostly on subjective indicators that try to assess the effectiveness of competition pol-
icy across countries, in terms of their respective growth and productivity. Both these papers
show that antitrust has a strong positive impact on growth and productivity. Subjective indica-
tors measure the perceived effectiveness of policy, using surveys of mainly business people.
There are two measures of perceived effectiveness of competition policy. The World Econom-
ic Forum (WEF) used the Executive Opinion Survey to compile the Global Competitiveness Re-
port.1It asks executives to rank their country according to the following statement: “Antimonop-
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promotes competition.” The other indicator is the one included in the World Competitiveness
Yearbook that is compiled by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD).2
IMD asks, “Is competition legislation efficient in preventing unfair competition?” According to
Voigt (2006), the two subjective measures of perceived competition are highly correlated (over
80%), and they are both also correlated with general policy effectiveness.
Neither the WEF nor the IMD indicator of competition policy effectiveness offer data
that separates the effect of national competition policy from the EU competition policy;
therefore, it indicates the overall effect of both policies for the EU member states.
Synthetic indicators are comprised of information from different policy aspects, like the
presence or absence of certain legal provisions, the rules adjudicating antitrust cases, the
severity of penalties, and the resources available to the competition authority and its auton-
omy. The indicators show the variance across countries in the design and implementation of
antitrust policy.
For instance, rules adjudicating antitrust cases differ strongly among the countries and
policy domains. In some countries, some competition restrictions, such as price fixing agree-
ments, bid rigging or imposing minimum resale prices, are per se illegal. For example price
fixing agreements are illegal per se in Australia, Greece, Mexico; and the USA defines, this
conduct as unlawful, regardless of its effect on competition. In 1990 Italy also joined the
group of countries that define price-fixing as per se illegal. By contrast, in most countries
competition restrictions are judged according to the rule of reason, even price fixing tends to
be adjudicated on a case by case basis in the European Union and in most European juris-
dictions. Conduct is judged lawful or unlawful, depending on its effect on competition, as
determined by the evidence in each case. As Motta (2004) has highlighted, article 81(3) of
the Treaty of the European Union states that all agreements among competitors do not fall
under a per se rule of prohibition.
Conversely, Gual et al. (2005) and Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla (2004) state that Europe
tends to use the per se illegality rule, when adjudicating the use of exclusionary practices
such as foreclosure, predatory pricing, price squeezes, fidelity rebates or tying by dominant
firms. Similar cases are judged, using the rule of reason, on a case by case basis in the USA
and in other jurisdictions.
The differences among countries are not only restricted to adjudicating rules, but also
exist in matters such as the degree of independence of the antitrust authorities, the use of
criminal sanctions, the way plaintiffs can seek redress before civil courts, whether to adopt
an economic or legal approach to dominant position abuses, merger policy objectives and
enforcement.
There have been different efforts to systematically compare competition rules and institu-
tions across countries. Nicholson (2004) reviews the different efforts made at quantifying an-
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al Competition Review, the official research partner of the International Bar Association, pub-
lishes accounts of the specific legal and enforcement aspects of competition policy in different
domains, such as cartels, abuses of dominant position and mergers in developed countries.4
Voigt (2006) has undertaken the most comprehensive quantitative analysis of competi-
tion laws. He gathered information regarding the basis of competition laws, legal regimes
and economic approaches; i.e. per se rules versus the rule of reason, the structure of compe-
tition authorities and de jure and de facto independence. He constructed indicators regarding
these aspects of competition policy, and has made assumptions on how these elements have
made competition policy effective.
Subjective and objective measures both have strengths and weaknesses. The subjec-
tive measures depend strongly on the expectations of the business people surveyed, re-
garding their views on effective competition policy, whereas the objective indicators de-
pend on how they are constructed. A higher value of the indicator can be achieved by
optimizing certain areas, while other very important elements are replaced with less de-
cisive or incomplete components; however, this can blur the robustness of the whole pol-
icy when being evaluated. By making the nature of the relationship between subjective
measures of effectiveness and the objective antitrust design indicators and enforcement
more explicit, we can understand the strength and weaknesses of comparative antitrust
analysis across countries better.
3. Empirical Strategy and Data
In this paper the data will explain the relationship of the perceived effectiveness of an-
titrust versus a set of objective characteristics of competition policy design and enforcement.
Our starting point is that average antitrust effectiveness depends mostly on three differ-
ent sets of covariates. Firstly, we would expect the average policy effectiveness to increase
when there is a specialized administrative or judicial body in charge of antitrust law enforce-
ment. Secondly, we expect antitrust statutes to be more effective when implemented selec-
tively, and when tough prohibitions and sanctions are imposed on the more damaging com-
petition restrains. Finally, we would expect the effectiveness of antitrust to be correlated
with mean income, as is generally the case for all public policies.
As to who should enforce antitrust, Carlton and Picker (2007) proffer the principal-agent
approach found in modern political science literature on legislative bargaining. They analyse
the pros and cons of government regulation versus antitrust, whether, either by special agen-
cies or by the judiciary, as a means of controlling competition. They conclude that, histori-
cally, the increased enforcement of antitrust law has brought benefits to consumers. Some-
times the benefits came after the government regulation had been replaced by antitrust, but
on other occasions the two need to be used in tandem.
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merger policy, we are going to empirically analyse them in accordance with recent literature
on antitrust effectiveness. Baker (2003) and Kaplow and Shapiro (2007) have shown what
effective antitrust enforcement is for a consensus of lawyers and economists. In the domains
of prosecution and deterrence of cartels, the most important policy is to fight against high
profile international cartels that cause substantial harm. With respect to monopolization, the
key issue is to prosecute dominant firms that engage in the more harmful exclusionary prac-
tices. And, merger policies have to be tailored to remedy the harmful effects of a tiny pro-
portion of horizontal mergers in concentrated markets. This could eventually lead to unilat-
eral price increases and mergers that affect competition in the development of new products.
We have gathered qualitative information regarding the institutional setting up of antitrust,
cartel policy enforcement, the handling of monopolization and dominant positions, and the fea-
tures of merger policy worldwide including developed and developing countries. We have
coded information for 13 distinctive objective policy features, that is, 611 items of data. We
also have information on subjective antitrust effectiveness indicators and mean income.
We will analyse the data using cross-section variation. Most covariates are not expected to
vary much from one year to another, so it would not be more informative to have a panel data with
year observations around 2004. And, unfortunately, the available data does not allow us to analyse
the effect of long-run governance changes on antitrust effectiveness using panel data techniques as
in Gutiérrez (2003) for telecoms regulation and in Cubbin and Stern (2006) for electricity.
Table 1 shows the definition of the coded data, and table 2 shows the data’s descriptive
statistics. Table 3 shows the distribution of the detailed features of the setting up, design and
implementation of antitrust policy across countries.
Table 1
VARIABLES IN THE DATASET
Name Acronym Source Description
Antitrust effectiveness effectiv WEF Anti-monopoly policy in your country (1 = is lax
and not effective at promoting competition,
7 = effectively promotes competition)
Independence on antitrust decisions indcard Authors 1 = There is an independent competition authority;
0 = In other case
Government prosecution mininst Authors 1 = There is an competition authority but a
dependent ministry of the executive files complains;
0 = In other case
Cartel per se illegal cartperse Authors 1 = Cartels are per se illegal;
0 = Cartels are adjudicated using the rule of reason
Published guidelines for cartel cartelguide Authors 1 = Competition authority has published some
enforcement cartel guidelines; 0 = Otherwise
Criminal sanctions penalcart Authors 1 = Cartels are criminal felonies; 0 = In other case
Punitive damages danoscart Authors 1 = It is possible to claim for punitive damages;
0 = Otherwise
Leniency programs leniency Authors 1 = There is a leniency program; 0 = Otherwise
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VARIABLES IN THE DATASET
(Continued)
Name Acronym Source Description
Dominance abuses per se illegal dompos Authors 1 = Per se for dominant position;
0 = Rule of Reason for dominant position
Dominance defined by market  thresdom GCR 1 = It exist a threshold obove which a position is
share qualified as dominant; 0 = In other case
Dominance threshold levthresd GCR 1 = If it exists, level of the threshold dominant position;
(0 or 20 to 70%)0   = In other case
Published merger guidelines mergerguide Authors 1 = Competition authority has published some
merger guidelines; 0 = Otherwise
Government has the last say findecmerg Authors 1 = Government has the last say on mergers;
mergers 0 = Competition authority takes decisions
regarding mergers
Protecting competition in objectimerg Authors 1 = Legal mandate for merger control is protecting
merger law competition; 0 = It is protecting the public interest 
in general




Acronym Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Antitrust effectiveness effectiv 47 4.66 0.89 2.8 6.1
Independence on antitrust decisions indcart 47 0.94 0.25 0 1
Government prosecution minist 47 0.13 0.34 0 1
Cartel per se illegal cartperse 47 0.34 0.48 0 1
Published guidelines for cartel cartelguide 47 0.23 0.43 0 1
enforcement
Criminal sanctions penalcart 47 0.36 0.49 0 1
Punitive damages danoscart 47 0.23 0.43 0 1
Leniency programs leniency 47 0.47 0.50 0 1
Dominance abuses per se illegal dompos 47 0.32 0.47 0 1
Dominance defined by market share thresdom 47 0.70 0.46 0 1
Dominance threshold (0 or 20 to 70%) levthresd 47 28.36 21.15 0 70
Published merger guidelines merguide 47 0.62 0.49 0 1
Government has the last say mergers findecmerg 47 0.43 0.50 0 1
Protecting competition in merger law obtectimerg 47 0.91 0.28 0 1
Authority Independence ind 47 0.87 0.28 0 1
Active stance in cartel policy cartel 47 1.64 1.24 0 5
Economic approach in dominance law dominance 47 –0,74 0.56 –1,75 0
Competition focussed merger policy merger_pol 47 2.11 0.87 0 3
Per capita GDP cgdp 47 19,164.81 9,111,38 3,212,53 37,313.33
EU-15 eu15 47 0.30 0.46 0 1
EU-Enlargement 2004 eu15-25 47 0.21 0.41 0 1
Bulgaria & Romania eu-25-27 47 0.04 0.20 0 1
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DISTRIBUTION OF OBJECTIVE FEATURES OF COMPETITION POLICY
Variable Value Countries for which the variable takes the value shown
Independence on antitrust decisions 0 Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela
Government prosecution 1 Belgium, France, India, Latvia, Spain, Malta
Cartel per se illegal 1 Australia, Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Slovenia, France,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Romania,
South Africa, USA, Venezuela
Published guidelines for cartel 1 Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Japan, Korea,
enforcement Malta, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA
Criminal sanctions 1 Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, India, Ireland,
Island, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Taiwan, United Kingdom, USA
Punitive damages 1 Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, New Zealand,
Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Taiwan, USA
Leniency programs 1 Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Netherlands, Hungary, Ireland, Korea, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Slovak Republic,
Sweden, United Kingdom, USA
Dominance abuses per se illegal 1 Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Mexico,
Romania, South, Venezuela
Dominance defined by market share 0 Australia, Belgium, Chile, Cyprus, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Finland, Japan, Kenya, Luxemburg, Mexico, New Zealand,
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Venezuela
Published merger guidelines 1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech
Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
United Kingdom, USA, Venezuela
Protecting competition in merger law 0 Argentina, Poland, Portugal, Taiwan
Government has the last say on mergers 1 Argentina, Belgium, Cyprus, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy,
Malta, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, Taiwan
OCDE countries in italics, and EU countries bolded.
Our aim is to identify and quantify the impact of a set of policy features on mean an-
titrust effectiveness. We use the World Economic Forum (WEF) “effectiveness of antitrust
policy” as the dependent variable that needs to be explained. Table 2 shows that antitrust ef-
fectiveness ranges from 2.8 to 6.1, and it also shows that the sample average is 4.66.
Firstly, we will estimate the impact of all the detailed qualitative coded information on the
effectiveness of antitrust features controlling per capita income and EU membership. We do
not expect to obtain precise estimates from this first empirical specification, because sound pol-
icy is rarely based on single feature of a policy, but we expect the data to highlight some salient
characteristics. Secondly, we will construct four indicators based on what the literature has
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with respect to cartel policy, an economic approach to dominance law and competition focused
merger policy. We then estimate how important having a sounder policy design in each domain
is for overall antitrust effectiveness, again controlling for per capita income and EU member-
ship. Thirdly, we group the averages of these four policy domain indicators into two summa-
ry indicators using weights based on the principal components analysis. This type of analysis
allows us to identify to what extent sound policy in one domain correlates with sound policy
in another, but it is uncorrelated with sound policy in yet other domains. This can help us to
understand the transitional path to more effective antitrust within the cross-section.
Income is measured by using GDP per capita in 2003 in US dollars; this is the most re-
cent data available for all the countries in the Penn World Table sample.5 Table 2 shows that
income ranges from US$3,212 in India to US$37,313 in the USA; average income is
US$19,164. EU countries constitute 55% of our sample and table 2 also shows that 30% are
EU15 countries, and 21% are the new EU members.
As stated before, we include income in all the estimations, because we want a control set for
the omitted variables that are heavily correlated with income; examples are the general quality of
public policies. Voigt (2006) has already shown that it is difficult to separate the effects of better
antitrust from the quality of other policies. Countries with higher incomes would be expected to
have better staffed and better resourced antitrust authorities. Those countries probably have bet-
ter detection, sanctioning infrastructure and technologies. Additionally, as we expect antitrust to
spur income, we have estimated the coefficients using instrumental variables techniques.
By including income per capita, we also take into account a set of national characteris-
tics that are strongly correlated with income per capita, and make antitrust enforcement eas-
ier; examples are the degree of rule of law in the country, the policy measures available to
control corruption, the overall quality of economic regulation, the mechanisms in place to
make politicians accountable, the efficiency of the legal system, the intensity of competition
in local markets, the degree of firm and corporate power decentralization and the openness
to international trade. Using data from the World Bank Institute, the World Economic Forum
and Transparency International we have computed coefficient correlations between per capi-
ta income and these types of national characteristics ranging from 91% to 60%, see table 4.
Therefore, controlling just for income allows us to have a parsimonious specification.
Most of these income related covariates would also be endogenous; however, we prefer
to only include conveniently instrumented income, in order to get unbiased and consistent
estimates, rather than including those endogenous covariates in the regression analysis. Find-
ing the appropriate instruments for all these covariates would have proved very difficult, and
estimates could easily have turned biased and inconsistent.
The objective features of competition policy across countries come from the information
provided by CUTS International, Global Competition Review, the International Competition
Network, the annual OECD reports and the national government agencies web pages and sta-
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coded, taking values 0 or 1.
Table 4
CORRELATION BETWEEN PER CAPITA GDP AND OTHER COVARIATES
Source Per capita GDP
Intensity of Local Competition WEF 0.60
Descentralization of Corporate Activity WEF 0.72
Openness of Customs Regime WEF 0.72
Efficiency of Legal Framework WEF 0.76
Voice and Accountability WBI 0.81
Regulatory Quality WBI 0.82
Perception of Corruption Index TI 0.88
Control of Corruption WBI 0.89
Rule of Law WBI 0.91
Source: World Economic Forum (WEF), World Bank Institute (WBI), Transparency International (TI), and Penn Table.
As outlined before, we have computed four indicators that are related to the organiza-
tional structure of competition policy; these four are comprised of the “authority independ-
ence”, the “active stance of cartel policy”, “economic approach to dominance law”, and
“competition focused merger policy”. Table 2 offers some descriptive statistics of the objec-
tive features and the indicators. We have computed the indicators as follows.
“Authority Independence” takes into account two objective features of the antitrust au-
thorities: independence in antitrust decisions and independence of prosecution. Most coun-
tries have independent competition authorities that take the final decisions on prohibiting
and sanctioning; i.e. agreements and abuses of dominant position. Those competition author-
ities, whether administrative or judicial, decide in these policy areas independently of their
governments, and the judiciary alone reviews their decisions. 
Table 3 shows that only Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela have competition restric-
tions prohibitions enforced directly by government. We have also gathered information on
whether it is the government or the independent authority that investigates and files the
cases. Table 3 shows that only in Belgium, France, India, Latvia, Spain (until 2007) and
Malta do the governments investigate the cases to be finally adjudicated, either by judicial
or administrative independent authorities. We wish to identify to what extent the independ-
ence of antitrust authorities is good for effective antitrust enforcement, and whether gov-
ernment prosecution is detrimental to antitrust effectiveness. The summary indicator takes
the value of 0 when a government investigates and adjudicates cases. It takes the value of
1/2 when the government investigates but an independent authority adjudicates; and it takes
the value of 1, if as the independent authority is responsible for the investigation and adju-
dication. Table 2 shows that the mean of this indicator is 0.87.
The indicator “Active stance of cartel policy” is the sum of the five antitrust character-
istics that are supposed to strengthen cartel policy enforcement. In their papers Polinsky and
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mouguin and Fluet (2004) and Borrell (2007) emphasise that defining cartels as per se ille-
gal acts is a stronger deterrent than declaring them illegal using the rule of reason. Systems
of civil sanctions, whereby firms pay damages to those injured by competition restrictions
and receive criminal penalties, also spurs deterrence. Enforcement guidelines are also pre-
sumed to improve antitrust effectiveness, as are the leniency programmes, under which firms
and executives may report misbehaviour to antitrust authorities in order to obtain partial or
full redemption for past sanctions. Table 2 shows that the mean of this index is just 1.64 out
of 5, and table 3 shows the distribution of cartel policy design in this domain.
By contrast, the defining of abuses of dominant position as per se illegal is increasingly
contested. Gal (2003) and Borrell (2007) emphasise that in large, integrated and mature mar-
kets it is better to judge abusive practices by dominant firms using a rule of reason approach.
As markets around the world are becoming increasingly integrated, we would generally ex-
pect the rule of reason, and a more economic approach to abuses of dominant position, to be-
come more and more effective. This is also what Gual et al. (2005) and Ahlborn, Evans and
Padilla (2004) suggest is the case for Europe. The “Economic approach in dominance law”
indicator measures three characteristics: Whether the legal standard for judging abuses of
dominant positions is the per se illegality rule, whether dominance is defined using a thresh-
old market share, and  the level of the marrket share threshold. Both binary characteristics
are expected to negatively affect the success of antitrust. By contrast, the market share
threshold that defines dominance enters positively; enforcement is expected to improve as
the binding market share increases. The national market share that defines dominance ranges
from a tight 20% in Brazil to a lax 70% in the USA. In the former case practices by only
slightly dominant firms are investigated, while in the latter only the practices of very domi-
nant firms are investigated. Table 2 shows that the mean index of “Economic approach in
dominance law” is –0.74, and that it ranges from –1.75 to 0.
Finally, the “Competition focused merger policy” index is the sum of three objective poli-
cy features: whether merger guidelines have been published, whether the government or the an-
titrust authority has a final say on merger policy, and whether the legal mandate for merger pol-
icy is focused on protecting competition or pursues broader public interests. Table 2 shows this
indicator has a mean of 2.11 out of 3. Table 3 shows that 62%, or 29 out of 47 countries, have
merger guidelines. It also shows that there are many countries where governments have the final
say on mergers. Examples are the largest European economies, France, Germany, Italy and
Spain. Smaller and very effective countries in terms of antitrust enforcement are Finland and
New Zealand; others are Argentina, India and Taiwan. There is, however, a rather small group
of countries in which the legal mandate in merger law is not to protect competition, but to pro-
tect the public interest in general; Argentina, Poland, Portugal and Taiwan are examples.
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix among the coded objective features of competition
policy and per capita income. Apart from the obvious correlation between the existence and
the level of the dominance threshold, none of the correlation coefficients are larger than
42%, and only two correlation coefficients are over 40%; they are the income per capita ver-
79 The drivers of antitrust effectivenesssus the dummy of whether there are approved cartel guidelines, and whether it is the domi-
nant abuses or cartels are considered per se illegal.
Table 5
CORRELATION AMONG ANTITRUST FEATURES AND INCOME
CGPD_03 indcart mininst cartperse cartel- penalcart daoscart guide
Per capita GDP cgdp_03 1.00
Independence on antitrust decisions indcart 0.34 1.00
Government prosecution mininst –0.02 0.10 1.00
Cartel per se cartperse –0.10 –0.18 –0.01 1.00
Cartel guide cartelguide 0.42 0.14 –0.06 –0.08 1.00
Criminal sanctions penalcart 0.15 0.20 –0.02 –0.07 0.21 1.00
Punitive damages daoscart 0.21 0.14 –0.21 –0.08 0.05 0.32 1.00
Leniency programs leniency 0.34 0.24 –0.10 –0.04 0.29 0.18 0.29
Per se dominance abuses rules dompos –0.31 –0.19 0.15 0.47 –0.16 –0.04 –0.06
Dominance defined by market share thresdom 0.11 0.40 –0.03 –0.12 0.14 0.30 0.25
Dominance threshold (0 or 20 to 70%) levthresd 0.27 0.35 –0.05 –0.04 0.27 0.38 0.28
Published merger guidelines merguide 0.34 0.15 0.04 –0.08 0.44 0.05 0.13
Government has the last say on mergers findecmerg –0.01 –0.13 0.32 –0.16 –0.17 –0.20 –0.07
Protecting competition in merger law objetimerg 0.13 –0.08 0.12 0.22 0.17 0.07 –0.01
leniency dompos thresdom levthresd merg- findec- objecti-
guide merg merg
Leniency programs leniency 1.00
Per se dominance abuses rules dompos –0.09 1.00
Dominance defined by market share thresdom 0.05 0.05 1.00
Dominance threshold (0 or 20 to 70%) levthresd 0.14 0.05 0.88 1.00
Published merger guidelines merguide 0.48 –0.21 0.06 0.15 1.00
Government has the last say on mergers findecmerg –0.03 –0.04 –0.29 –0.31 –0.12 1.00
Protecting competition in merger law objetimerg 0.13 0.21 –0.03 0.09 0.07 –0.35 1.00
We have computed the Bartlett test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) meas-
ure of sampling adequacy for all the coded antitrust variables together, and for the four policy
domains that have constructed indicators. The null hypothesis of the Bartlett test is that the vari-
ables are not correlated. The data does not reject that null hypothesis; and as there was no KMO
measure above 0.50, so the data is not correlated enough to use principal component analysis
proposed by OCDE research such as Nicoletti et al. (2000) and Conway and Nicoletti (2006) to
create weights for the features that make up each indicator. The coded variables report non-cor-
related characteristics of antitrust policy design and implementation.
Table 6 shows the correlation matrix for the domain indicators and income per capita.
None of the correlation coefficients are over 42%, and only one correlation coefficient is
above 40%; i.e. “Active stance in cartel policy” versus “Competition focused merger policy.”
However, the Bartlett test of sphericity rejects the null hypothesis that these variables are not
correlated. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy is 0.57, above the 0.50 threshold. From
this we can obtain factors that form averages of the four domain indicators, using the weights
based on principal components analysis.
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CORRELATION AMONG POLICY DOMAIN INDICATORS
cgdp_2003 ind cartel dominant merger_pol
Per capita GDP cgdp_03 1.00
Authority Independence ind 0.30 1.00
Active stance in cartel policy cartel 0.38 0.27 1.00
Economic approach in dominance law dominant 0.28 0.04 –0.09 1.00
Competition focussed merger policy merger_pol 0.24 0.19 0.42 –0.02 1.00
Factor analysis lets us know which domain indicators are correlated, and how group-
ing them by factors impacts on antitrust effectiveness, by following the methods proposed
by the OCDE for estimating the indicators of product market regulation. Following the
method proposed by Nicoletti et al. (2000) and Conway and Nicoletti (2006), we use prin-
cipal component analysis to extract the factors after testing the correlation of the indica-
tors that we have extracted the factors from. We save those factors that have eigenvalues
larger than unity, individually explain over 10% of the overall variance, and cumulatively
contribute to explaining more than 60% of the data’s total variance.
We then rotate the factors to decrease the correlation among them, and to make their
interpretation easier. Finally, we give each policy domain indicator a weight, according to
its normalized squared loading or the proportion of the variance that it explains; Table 7
shows the results of the factor analysis. The four policy domain indicators are the sum of
two factors. One factor is almost entirely associated with the “Economic approach to dom-
inance law” with a weight of 89%, and the other is the average of the other three policy
domain indicators “Active stance of cartel policy” 41%, “Competition focused merger pol-
icy” 31%, and “Authority independence” 21%.
Table 7
FACTOR ANALYSIS USING PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS
Factor 1 Factor 2
Weights of Weights of
Factor variables Factor variables
loading in factor loading in factor
Authority Independence 0.61 0.23 0.30 0.09
Active stance in cartel policy 0.81 0.41 –0.15 0.02
Economic approach in dominance law –0.05 0.00 0.96 0.89
Competition ffocussed merger policy 0.76 0.36 –0.06 0.00
Selection criteria
Eigenvalues 1.60 1.02
Variance explained by factors 1.40 0.26
Total variance explained by factors 0.66
Bartlett test of sphericity Chi(6) = 12.64**
Kaisser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.571
Factor loading based on rotated component matrix using the varimax method (orthogonal).
Weights using normalised square factor loading
**: for 5% significance level
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Tables 8, 9 and 10 show the results of the regression analysis. Table 8 shows the impact
of the general indicators upon effectiveness. Table 9 shows the impact the two factors have
on effectiveness. Table 10 details the impact of each objective feature of antitrust design and
enforcement on effectiveness. In the three tables we show the impact of the policy covari-
ates on effectiveness without controls (column 1); the impact when controlling for the effect
of EU membership distinguishing among EU-15 countries, the countries of the 2004 enlarge-
ment and the last new members, Bulgaria and Romania (column 2); the impact when con-
trolling for per capita GDP (column 3); and, the impact when controlling for both EU mem-
bership and per capita GDP (column 4).
Table 8
IMPACT OF BROAD INDICATORS OF POLICY DESIGN OF EFFECTIVENESS
log(effectiveness)
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) IV (4) IV
Intercept –0.60*** (6.72) –0.64*** (9.01) –2.97*** (5.60) –2.17*** (3.92)
Authority Independence 0.13 (1.47) 0.14* (1.87) 0.03 (0.50) 0.08 (1.50)
Active stance in cartel policy 0.05** (2.03) 0.05*** (2.70) 0.02 (0.99) 0.02 (1.56)
Economic approach in dominance law 0.13*** (2.73) 0.12*** (2.81) 0.08** (2.02) 0.09*** (2.43)
Competition focussed merger policy 0.04 (1.17) 0.04 (1.47) 0.04 (1.55) 0.04* (1.84)
Log per capita GDP 0.25*** (4.63) 0.16*** (2.82)
EU-15 0.16*** (3.25) 0.07 (1.61)
EU-Enlargement 2004 –0.09 (1.53) –0.08* (1.90)
Bulgaria & Romania –0.23*** (4.27) –0.13* (1.69)
R2 0.35 0.63 0.54 0.65
F test F(4,42)=6.32*** F(7,39)=55.09*** F(5.41)=7.50*** F(8,38)=19.36***
Hansen Over-id J test Chi(1)=0.87 Chi(1)=0.94
1. The table report the t statistics robust to heterocedasticity in parenthesis. The table reports the values of the F
test and the Hansen Overid test.
*, **, ***: for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
2. The null hypothesis of the Hansen J overidentification test is that the instruments are orthogonal with respect
to the residual of the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show that the test value is smaller than the critical values, so
we do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments.
As outlined before, when per capita GDP is included in the regression as a control we run
the regression using the instrumental variable techniques (IV). We use per capita GDP of 1994
and its square as instruments for per capita GDP of 2003. We estimate the IV regression using
a cumulative updated GMM routine which computes standard errors that are robust to hetero-
cedastic disturbance matrix. We report that the Hansen J overidentification test shows the instru-
ments are valid. We have also computed tests that show that instruments are strong.7
By comparing regression estimates that include per capita GDP, using the OLS and IV
techniques, we show that OLS estimates are biased slightly upwards; that is the OLS esti-
mates not only measures the causal positive selection effect of per capita GDP on antitrust
effectiveness, but also the simultaneous positive policy effect of antitrust effectiveness on
per capita GDP. This has previously been shown by Borrell and Tolosa (2008).
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the design of antitrust policy matters. It matters the most how dominance policy is designed
and how it is enforced. Countries embracing an economic approach to investigating alleged
dominant position abuses by firms have a more effective antitrust policy. This way of en-
forcing dominance policies is statistically significant. Additionally, having a merger policy
more competition focused is good for antitrust effectiveness; however, this effect is statisti-
cally weaker. It is only significant at the 10% level.
Taking an active stance on cartel policy also has a positive effect on antitrust effectiveness;
however, cartel policy is no longer statistically significant when we include the per capita GDP
control. Independent authorities have a weaker but positive effect on antitrust, and are only sig-
nificant at the 10% level when EU membership is included but per capita income is not.
Table 9 shows the impact of the two factors on effectiveness, and the results are very ro-
bust across the specifications. Apart from the impact of per capita income and EU member-
ship on antitrust, it appears clearly that having an “Economic approach to dominance law”
has a strong positive impact on effectiveness. Increasing this indicator by one standard de-
viation spurs effectiveness by 5% to 9%. Furthermore, it appears that effectiveness is strong-
ly and positively affected by having a combination of authority independence, better cartel
policy indicators and improved merger policy. Increasing the factor that averages these three
indicators by one standard deviation promotes effectiveness by 4% to 7%. 
Table 9
IMPACT OF BROAD INDICATORS OF POLICY DESIGN OF EFFECTIVENESS
log(effectiveness)
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) IV (4) IV
Intercept –0.45*** (12.48) –1.52*** (2.89) –2.88*** (6.84) –2.03*** (4.58)
Factor 1: Authority Independence, 0.09*** (5.40) 0.07*** (3.03) 0.08*** (2.32) 0.06*** (3.12)
active stance in cartel policy and
competition focussed merger policy
Factor 2: Economic approach in 0.07*** (2.97) 0.04* (1.95) 0.04*** (2.30) 0.05*** (2.48)
dominance law
Log per capita GDP 0.11** (2.07) 0.25*** (5.90) 0.16*** (3.66)
EU-15 0.16*** (3.58) 0.09* (1.76) 0.07* (1.83)
EU-Enlargement 2004 –0.09 (1.65) –0.10* (1.99) –0.09* (1.93)
Bulgaria & Romania –0.23*** (5.54) –0.18*** (2.81) –0.13** (2.04)
R2 0.63 0.68 0.53 0.66
F test F(5,41)=71.08*** F(6,40)=30.17*** F(3,43)=21.97*** F(6,40)=29.15***
Hansen Over-id J test Chi(1)=0.87 Chi(1)=1.0
t statistics robust to heterocedasticity in parenthesis. *, **, ***: for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
1. The table report the t statistics robust to heterocedasticity in parenthesis. The table reports the values of the F
test and the Hansen Overid test.
*, **, ***: for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
2. The null hypothesis of the Hansen J overidentification test is that the instruments are orthogonal with respect
to the residual of the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show that the test value is smaller than the critical values, so
we do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments.
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petition policy features. It details the main drivers of the previously outlined results, although the
large number of covariates makes our results slightly less precise. However, as previously men-
tioned, the correlation among the covariates is not so strong as to make the estimates inaccurate.
Table 10
IMPACT OF DETAILED FEATURES OF COMPETITION POLICY
OF EFFECTIVENESS
log(effectiveness)
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) IV (4) IV
Intercept –0.89*** (5.50) –0.87*** (8.89) –2.66*** (6.18) –1.92*** (5.07)
Independence on antitrust decisions 0.26*** (3.13) 0.26*** (4.05) 0.10* (1.70) 0.19*** (3.15)
Government prosecution –0.03 (0.43) –0.03 (0.56) –0.01 (0.24) –0.01 (0.22)
Cartel per se 0.02 (0.30) 0.03 (0.58) 0.00 (0.06) 0.01 (0.29)
Cartel guide 0.02 (0.41) –0.04 (0.81) –0.04 (0.93) –0.06* (1.73)
Criminal sanctions 0.07 (1.22) 0.07 (1.19) 0.09*** (2.12) 0.07 (1.64)
Punitive damages –0.05 (0.75) –0.01 (0.18) –0.09* (1.77) –0.05 (0.88)
Leniency damages 0.06 (1.16) 0.06 (1.37) 0.06 (1.55) 0.07** (2.06)
Per se dominance abuses rules –0.12 (1.61) –0.13** (2.23) –0.05 (1.11) –0.08** (1.98)
Dominance defined by market share –0.24*** (2.57) –0.20*** (2.66) –0.11 (1.36) –0.14* (1.88)
Dominance threshold (0 or 20 to 70%) 0.005*** (2.54) 0.004** (2.25) 0.002 (1.04) 0.003* (1.73)
Published merger guidelines 0.06 (0.96) 0.05 (1.19) 0.04 (1.04) 0.04 (1.34)
Government has the last say on mergers 0.07 (1.16) 0.03 (0.70) 0.03 (0.82) 0.02 (0.72)
Protecting competition in merger law 0.19 (1.45) 0.19** (2.35) 0.15* (1.78) 0.17** (2.56)
Log per capita GDP 0.20*** (4.20) 0.12*** (2.81)
EU-15 0.11** (2.06) 0.04 (1.02)
EU-Enlargement 2004 –0.11* (1.93) –0.12*** (2.74)
Bulgaria & Romania –0.29*** (5.39) –0.22*** (4.38)
R2 0.53 0.75 0.68 0.78
F test F(13,33)=12.96*** F(16,30)=27.14*** F(14,32)=11.37*** F(17,29)=33.20***
Hansen Over-id J test Chi-sq(1)=1.44 Chi-sq(1)=0.46
1. The table report the t statistics robust to heterocedasticity in parenthesis. The table reports the values of the F
test and the Hansen Overid test. *, **, ***: for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
2. The null hypothesis of the Hansen J overidentification test is that the instruments are orthogonal with respect
to the residual of the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show that the test value is smaller than the critical values, so
we do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments.
Table 10 shows that the independence of the authority when adjudicating cases drives antitrust
effectiveness. The authority’s independence when adjudicating cases of cartel and dominance does
make antitrust more effective even taking into account per capita GDP, EU membership and the
other covariates. On average, Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela have worse competition poli-
cy; these are the three countries in the sample that lack an independent authority. Having govern-
mental power of investigation has a negative but not statistically significant impact on effective-
ness; here the relevant issue appears to be having an independent authority calling the shots.
We have previously seen that active stances on cartel policy in isolation doesn’t have a
significant impact on effectiveness, but leniency programmes do stand out as having an im-
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are the ones with more effective antitrust policies. Interestingly, it appears to be unimportant
whether cartels are prohibited using either the rule of reason or the per se illegality rule. This
result suggests that, as Borrell (2007) stated, there is no single legal rule that fits all coun-
tries in the domain of cartel policy. Or alternatively, that actual enforcement of cartel policy
is quite similar across countries irrespectively of the formal legal rule.
Table 10 also shows why the approach to dominance policy is important for antitrust effective-
ness. Countries that enforce dominance policy using a per se illegality rule have a significantly
worse antitrust effectiveness of around 8%. Countries that set a fixed market share to define dom-
inant positions also have a worse competition policy effectiveness of around 14%. However, an-
titrust effectiveness improves, as the market share that defines the dominant position gets larger.
Finally, what appears to be important in merger policy is to have a competition orientat-
ed legal mandate, rather than having a government or agency that decides on mergers. On
average, countries that aim to protect competition when authorising mergers have antitrust
policies that are 17% more effective.
5. Concluding remarks
The effectiveness of antitrust policy varies strongly across countries. This paper shows
that different institutional and policy characteristics drive the effectiveness of antitrust, and
concludes that antitrust cannot be effective in a vacuum. Competition policy effectiveness is
driven by per capita GDP and EU membership. It also shows how European Eastern coun-
tries are finding it particularly difficult to enforce effective antitrust policies.
Antitrust depends on income and EU membership, but is also more effective in some
countries than in others. Having an economic approach to dominance law clearly makes an-
titrust more effective. Investigating dominance using an economic approach avoids the per
se illegality rules and underscores market share as potential source of market power; it also
makes antitrust sounder to have a competition orientated merger policy. Furthermore, engag-
ing in innovative policies such as leniency makes antitrust more effective. Finally, authority
independence regarding decisions on prohibiting cartels and dominant position abuses seem
to be a prerequisite to sound antitrust; but it is not so important whether an independent
agency or the government conducts the antitrust investigations.
Notes
1. See Porter, M. E. et al. (2005).
2. See IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook in http://www.imd.ch/research/publications/wcy/index.cfm.
3. See Mehta (2006).
4. See Davis (2006), Rowley and Low (2006), and Wessely (2006).
85 The drivers of antitrust effectiveness5. See Heston, Summers and Aten (2006). We have not been able to use the 2004 data on per capita income be-
cause the per capita income of Brazil, Colombia, India and Latvia were missing from the Penn World Table
6.2 at the time of writing this paper.
6. See Mehta (2006), Davis (2006), Rowley and Low (2006), Wessely (2006), ICN, OCDE and nacional com-
petition authorities websites.
7. The Hansen J overidentification test is the GMM equivalent to the Sargan test. It is a test robust to the pres-
ence of heterocedasticity. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments: the instru-
ments are orthogonal with respect to the residuals of the regression. Under the null, the test statistic is distrib-
uted as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the
instruments. The tables show that the test values are always smaller than the critical values, so we do not re-
ject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments. See Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007)
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Resumen
Este trabajo muestra qué guía la efectividad de la política de competencia utilizando una base de datos internacio-
nal sobre la percepción de la efectividad de dicha política. El estudio concluye que la efectividad media depende de
la renta per cápita y de liderazgos supranacionales como el ejercido desde el núcleo de la Unión Europea. Adicio-
nalmente, el trabajo muestra que algunos aspectos del diseño de la política tienen un impacto significativo en sus
resultados. Así, la efectividad mejora con una aproximación económica a los casos de dominancia y prácticas abu-
sivas. Se demuestra que la efectividad mejora cuando el mandato legal para la política de concentraciones se cen-
tra en la competencia en los mercados, más que en el interés general. Además, una política de competencia más pro-
activa contra los carteles mejora la efectividad y, en particular, son muy valiosos los programas de clemencia.
Finalmente, es importante que la autoridad independiente de la competencia tenga la última palabra en cuanto a la
prohibición de prácticas restrictivas de la competencia.
Palabras claves:Política de competencia; Efectividad de la política; Económica política.
Clasificación JEL: D7; L4; O4.
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